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Thus, the writer suggests that the logic, precedent value and practicality
of the "separate but equal" doctrine be re-examined in its application to
segregated education in an effort to arrive at a just and realistic interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment."
BERNARD ALLEN BER MAN

Municipal Ownership of Off-Street Motor
Vehicle Parking Facilities in Ohio
IN 1949 THE Ohio Legislature, recognizing the magnitude of the traffic
congestion problem confronting many Ohio municipalities, passed legislation under which a municipality may acquire, maintain, operate and finance
off-street parking facilities.1 Purporting to act under this statute, the City
of Columbus, through its City Council, authorized the acquisition of offstreet parking facilities and established a plan for financing them with
mortgage revenue bonds. The mayor and the auditor of the city, anticipating the reluctance of investors to purchase the bonds because of uncertainty in the statute, declined to execute the bonds and coupons. The
city attorney promptly brought mandamus to compel their signatures. The
Ohio Supreme Court, in State ex rel. Gordon v. Rhodes,2 granted the writ,
holding unanimously that the Columbus City Council had acted not under
the authority of the statute but under a broader grant of power in the Ohio
Constitution.3
This decision and Ohio General Code Sections 3939-2 and 3939-3 furnish the bulk of Ohio law on the authority of municipalities to provide
municipally owned and operated off-street parking facilities. It is the
purpose of this note to appraise the law on this subject as it now stands and
to consolidate it into as comprehensive a form as possible.
A. What is the source of a municipality's power to provide off-street
parking facilities?
According to the court in the Rhodes case, the power of a municipality
lawful segregation, and the general inability of the average litigant to bear the financal burden in these cases will encourage Southern states to circumvent the law by
forcing the Negro to appeal to the
Supreme Court in every such action." Note,
30 NEB.L. Rav. 69, 71 (1950)
M"

We believe that not even the most mathematically precise equality of segre-

gated iastitutions can properly be considered equality under the law. No argument

or rationalization can alter this basic fact: a law which forbids a group of American
citizens to associate with other catizens in the ordinary course of daily living creates
inequality by imposing a caste status on the minority group."
Rights, President's Committee on Civil Rights 82 (1947).
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to establish, construct, maintain and operate off-street parking facilities
within its confines is anchored in Article XVIII, Section 3 of the Ohio Constitution. Ohio General Code Sections 3939-2 and 3939-3 were circumvented by the language of the court, which, in discussing the city's authority
to provide off-street parking facilities, asserted that the city had the power
to "pass, carry out, and enforce" its ordinances "irrespective of Sections
3939-2 and 3939-3, General Code."' However, the court did not find that
the code sections contravened the Ohio Constitution; it found merely that
they were "unnecessary for the accomplishment" of the city's project."
B. What is the extent and nature of a municipality's power to provide
off-street parking facilities?
The Ohio Constitution6 and the statute confer the following powers
upon municipalities:
1. The power to acquire, maintain and operate off-street parking
facilities for motor vehicles.8
2. The power to authorize and issue revenue bonds secured only by a
mortgage upon the facilities acquired. 9 The five per cent debt linmation
in the Uniform Bond Act'0 relating to the general indebtedness of a municipality does not apply to such bonds because the indebtedness does not pledge
the municipality's general credit or tax revenues."
3. The power to issue bonds pledging the general credit of the municipality for the acquisition of such facilities, provided neither the tax rate prescribed by the Ohio Constition 2 nor the debt limitation prescribed by the

Uniform Bond Act' 3 is exceeded.'
4. The power to pledge and apply revenue obtained from parking
meters on the street to the payment of revenue bonds issued for the purpose of financing off-street parking facilities. 5
Osio GEN. CODE §§ 3939-2, 3939-3.

156 Ohio St. 81, 100 N.E.2d 225 (1951).
OHIO CONST. Art. XVIII, § 3. "Municipalities shall have

authority to exercise
all powers of local self government and to adopt and enforce within their limits such
local police, sanitary and other similar regulations, as are not in conflict with general

laws."
'State ex rel. Gordon v. Rhodes, 156 Ohio St. 81, 99, 100 N.E.2d. 225, 234 (1951).
B Ibd.
OHIo CONST. Art. XVIII, § 3.
7OIo GEN. CODE §§ 3939-2, 3939-3.
BState ex rel. Gordon v. Rhodes, 156 Ohio St. 81, 100 N.E.2d. 225 (1951).
SAIbd.
'0OIo GEN. CODE §§ 2293-1 et seq.
'State ex rel. Gordon v. Rhodes, 156 Ohio St. 81, 100 N.E.2d. 225 (1951).
"OHIo CONsT. Art. XII, § 2.
13OIo GEN. CODE §§ 2293-1 et seq.
"State exrel. Gordon v. Jones, 156 Ohio St. 100, 100 N.E.2d. 235 (1951).
" State ex rel. Gordon v. Rhodes, 158 Ohio St. 129, 107 N.E.2d. 206 (1952).
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5. The power to acquire by purchase, gift, devise, exchange, lease or
sub-lease any existing off-street parking facility or any real estate or interest therein.1 6
off-street parking facilities by
6. The power to acquire real estate for
7
eminent domain, with certain limitations.1
7 The power to dispose of off-street parking facilities, upon determination by the legislative body of the muncipality that the facilities are
no longer needed.'
8. The power to use any money in the general fund of the mumcipality
not otherwise obligated or encumbered for the purpose of acquiring, operating and maintaining off-street parking facilities.'
C. What are the limitations upon the power of a mumcipality to provide off-street parking facilities?
The Ohio Supreme Court, in the first Rhodes case,20 set forth certain
conditions which must exist before a municipality may exercise its power
to acquire, maintain and operate off-street parking facilities.
1. The municipality must not have adopted a charter provision to the
contrary. '

2. Traffic congestion in the municipality must be severe enough to
body of the
warrant the acquisition of such facilities, and the legislative
22
municipality must make a determination to that effect.
3. The legislative body of the municipality must find that the facilities
will serve a public municipal purpose, and they must actually serve such a
purpose. 3 If the legislative body of the municipality fails to find that the
off-street parking facilities which the municipality proposes to acquire
would serve a public mumcipal purpose, or if such facilities do not, in fact,
serve such a purpose, the acquisition or operation of such facilities is un24
'constitutional.
The municipal legislative bodies are given much discretion in these
28

OMio GEN. CODE § 3939-2.

l" Ib.
3
Ibtd.
"'OmioGEN. CODE § 3939-3.
rState ex rel. Gordon v. Rhodes, 156 Ohio St. 81, 100 N.E.2d. 225 (1951). The
second Rhodes case merely decided that revenue from parking meters on the streets
could be applied to the payment of bonds issued to finance off-street parking. See

note 15 supra.
'State ex rel.Gordon v. Rhodes, 156 Ohio St. 81, 100 N.E.2d. 225 (1951), syllabus 1.
" Ibid, syllabi 1, 2.
ulbd, syllabus 2.
'City of Cleveland v. Ruple, 130 Ohio St. 465, 200 N.E. 507 (1936).

1953]

153]NOTES

determinative matters, and their decisions will not be upset unless mainfestly arbitrary or unreasonable.25
In addition, there are express statutory prohibitions limiting the exercise of the power.
1. The municipality is prohibited from using the power of eminent
domain to obtain, for off-street parking facilities, real estate held by a public
utility or railroad, or any real estate upon which off-street parking facilities
open to the general public have been established for one year prior to the
proposed acquisition thereof.28
2. The municipality is prohibited from exempting from state property
taxation real estate acquired "under the provisions of" the statute.Y7
3. The municipality is prohibited from diverting revenue derived
from the operation of off-street parking facilities, except such portions
thereof as may be necessary to pay taxes, maintenance expenses and operating expenses, to any purpose other than the retirement of the bonded in28
debtedness incurred by the acquisition of the facilities.
D. What areas of the law are undefined or uncertain?
The principal area of doubt concerns the significance of the statute and,
particularly, of the statutory prohibitions enumerated above, in view of
the decision in the first Rhodes case.
Ohio General Code Section 3939-3 provides m part that a municipality
mayissue and sell mortgage revenue bonds in the same manner and under
the same terms as mortgage revenue bonds may be issued under the authority of article XVIII, section 12 of the constitution of Ohio.
Article XVIII, Section 12 of the Ohio Constitution, which pertains to
public utility financing, provides among other things that mortgage
revenue bonds issued by a municipality beyond the general limits of bonded
indebtedness must include a franchise stating the terms upon which a purchaser could operate the mortgaged properties in case of foreclosure.
The Columbus City Council had failed to include any such franchise in
its ordinances, as required by Ohio General Code Section 3939-3, under
which it purported to act As a consequence, the Ohio Supreme Court in
the first Rhodes case, in upholding the action of the Columbus City Council,
found it necessary to circumvent the statute and establish the authority for
the controversial ordinances in some other source. The court found such a
source in Article XVIII, Section 3 of the Ohio Constitution.29
=State ex tel. Gordon v. Rhodes, 156 Ohio St. 81, 100 N.E.2d. 225 (1951).
Oino GEN.

CODE

§ 3939-2.

=Ibd.
, Omro GEN. CODE § 3939-3.
=See note 3 supra.
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The result attained in the case suggests several possible theories upon
which that result could have been reached, but any theory consistent with
the result is rejected either by the reasoning of the case or by well established
Ohio law which the decision does not purport to change.
The first of these theories is that the statute is unconstitutional because
municipally owned and operated off-street parking facilities are public
utilities. Although the opinion does not squarely confront the issue, the
result suggests that such facilities do fall into the same category as public
,utilities. If they do, a municipality's power to provide them resides in
Article XVIII, Section 4 of the Ohio Constitution," and under a long line
of Ohio decisions, legislative enactments designed to restrict the powers of
municipalities under this section are unconstitutional. 3'
This public utility theory is inconsistent with the opinion in one particular: Under it, a municipality would be subject to the financing provisions of Article XVIII, Section 12 of the Ohio Constitution 3 2 The court,
however, expressly rejects the contention that Article XVIII, Section 12 is
applicable. This rejection is easily explained by the fact that the decision
premises a municipality's power to provide off-street parking facilities in
Article XVIII, Section 3 of the Ohio Constitution.3 3 That section does not
apply to public utilities. Therefore, Article XVIII, Section 12, which applies only to public utilities, would naturally be inapplicable to a project
undertaken within the provisions of Article XVIII, Section 3.
In the opinion of this writer, the theory that municipally owned and
operated off-street parking facilities are public utilities is the theory most
consistent with the result. However, it was not the theory of the court, for
"0OHIO CONST. Art. XVIII, § 4. "Any municipality may acquire, construct, own,
lease and operate within or without its corporate limits any public utility, the product
or services of which is to be supplied to the municipality or its inhabitants, and may

contract with others for any such product or service. The acquisition of any such
public utility may be by condemnation or otherwise, and a municipality may acquire thereby the use of, or full title to, the property and franchise of any company
or person supplying to the municipality or its inhabitants the service or product of
any such utility."
"Ohio courts have consistently taken the position that municipalities derive the
right to acquire, construct, own, lease and operate utilities, the product of which is
to be supplied to the municipality or its inhabitants, from Article XVIII, Section 4
of the Ohio Constitution, and that the legislature is without power to impose limitations upon that right. Pfau v. City of Cincinnati, 142 Ohio St. 101, 50 N.E.2d. 172
(1943); Board of Education of City School District of Columbus v. City of Columbus, 118 Ohio St. 295, 160 N.E. 902 (1928); Colley v. Village of Englewood, 80
Ohio App. 540, 71 N.E.2d. 542 (1947)
"OHIO CoNsT. Art XVIII, § 12 provides that mortgage revenue bonds issued by a
municipality beyond the general limits of bonded indebtedness must include a franchise stating the terms upon which a purchaser could operate the mortgaged properties in case of foreclosure.
'See note 3 supra.
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this theory requires a finding that the statute is unconstitutional, and the
court expressly found that the statute was not unconstitutional. 34
A second theory that would explain the result is that Ohio General
Code Sections 3939-2 and 3939-3 are not "general laws" within the meaning of Article XVIIL Section 3 of the Ohio Constitution. 3 This possibility
is unmentioned in the opinion. It is not, however, a satisfactory hypothesis,
for although it explains the result in the first Rhodes case, it does not answer the question as to what the controversial code sections were intended
to be, if not general laws, and to whom or what the legislature expected
them to apply.36
The third theory is that the ordinances were not "in conflice with the
provisions of Ohio General Code Sections 3939-2 and 3939-3 within the
meaning of Article XVII, Section 3 of the Ohio Constitution. This seems
to be the court's theory of the case, but this writer cannot reconcile it with
the result. If the ordinances were at such variance with the statute that
the terms of the ordinances could not be carried out within the provisions of
the statute, the conclusion seems inescapable that the ordinances were in
conflict with the statute and, as such, in conflict with a general law within
the meaning of Artide XVII, Section 3 of the Ohio Constitution. There is
ample Ohio authority in support of this condusion.37
E. What additional legislation, if any, is desirable?
The doctrine of the Ohio decisions 3 on the power of municipalities to
provide and finance municipally owned off-street parking facilities is so
"State ex rel. Gordon v. Rhodes, 156 Ohio St. 81, 99, 100 N.E.2d. 225, 235
(1951).

' See note 3 supra.
'The words "general laws" within the meaning of Article XVIII, Section 3 of the
Ohio Constitution refer to laws passed by the legislature which are of general application throughout the state. State ex rel. Arey v. Sherrill, City Manager, 142 Ohio
St. 574, 53 N.E.2d. 501 (1944); City of Cincinnati v. Correll, 141 Ohio St. 535,
49 N.E.2d. 412 (1943); Leis v. Cleveland Railway Company, 101 Ohio St. 162,
128 N.E. 73 (1920).
' City of Cincnnati v. Gamble, 138 Ohio St 220, 34 N.E.2d. 226 (1941); Niehaus,
Building Inspector v. State, ex ret. Board of Education, 111 Ohio St. 47, 144 N.E.
433 (1924). In the latter case, the board of education, acting under authority
granted to it by statute, sought to obtain a building permit for the erection of a new
school building. A statute required that plans for such structures be approved by
the caty building inspector. The city building inspector declined to issue the permit
unless he was paid a fee as prescribed by a city ordinance. The statute did not provide for the payment of a fee to the municipality for the building permit. The
court held that the city could charge no fee for the service exacted by the statute,
and that a municipality could not, under the provisions of Article XVIII, Section 3
of the Ohio Constitution, abridge the sovereignty of the state by the enactment of
ordinances inconsistent with general laws.
'State ex rel. Gordon v. Rhodes, 156 Ohio St. 81, 100 N.E.2d. 225 (1951); State
ex rel. Gordon v. Jones, 156 Ohio St.100, 100 N.E.2d. 235 (1951); State ex rel.
Gordon v. Rhodes, 158 Ohio St 129, 107 N.E.2d 206 (1952).

